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Security review · March 2025

Sei Deployment

for USDT0

Guardian's review of Sei Deployment for USDT0, published March 2025. The report records 5 findings, including 5 informational.

Published
Review window
March 21 to 27, 2025
Language
Solidity
Chains
Sei
Sector
Stablecoins, Cross-chain
  • 0 Critical
  • 0 High
  • 0 Medium
  • 0 Low
  • 5 Informational

3 resolved · 2 acknowledged

Scope

Findings 5

  1. I-01 Informational Delegate As EOA Configuration Resolved
    Location
    Global

    Description

    The delegate for the OFT contract is assigned as an EOA address rather than the Safe address on Sei.

    Recommendation

    Assign the delegate as the Safe address on Sei.

  2. I-02 Informational oftContract Unassigned Configuration Resolved
    Location
    OFTExtension.sol

    Description

    The deployment of the OFTExtension USDT0 contract on Sei does not have an assigned oftContract value.

    Recommendation

    Assign the appropriate oftContract value for the OFTExtension contract.

  3. I-03 Informational Different Sei Owners Warning Resolved

    Description

    The Safe owners on Sei do not completely match the Safe owners on ETH. In particular, ETH Safe Owner eth:0x00F6D2b4B69Ce697f913Da16A9D73283dc4C78F2 is not on the Sei Safe. Furthermore, sei:0x1a6362AD64ccFF5902D46D875B36e8798267d154 is not a signer on the ETH safe.

    Recommendation

    Be aware of this and adjust signers as necessary.

  4. I-04 Informational Delegate Set Twice Configuration Acknowledged

    Description

    The delegate is set to address 0x4dff9b5b0143e642a3f63a5bcf2d1c328e600bf8 in transaction #6 of the Safe queue. However, the delegate is attempted to be set to the same address in the last transaction (#34) unnecessarily.

    Recommendation

    Remove transaction #34 from the queue so the delegate is not set again.

  5. I-05 Informational setPeer Called At DIfferent Times Documentation Acknowledged

    Description

    Cross-chain peers may be set at different times, such that chain A recognizes chain B as a trusted peer, but chain B has not yet set chain A as a peer. Users may send tokens from chain A to chain B, which will burn them, but the tokens will not be received on the destination chain until the peer relationship is fully configured. Consequently, the user may temporarily lose access to their funds.

    Recommendation

    Clearly document this behavior to users.

More from USDT0

All 34 reports
  1. USAT Reconfiguration

    1 finding 1 finding: 1 low
  2. Stellar Deployment

    2 findings 2 findings: 2 informational
  3. Corn Network Delisting

    1 finding 1 finding: 1 low
  4. Canary Chain Configuration Verification

    4 findings 4 findings: 4 informational

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