Protocol Review

The owner address, 0x3e522051a9b1958aa1e828ac24afba4a551df37d, is not a multi-sig and has potentially dangerous permissions for renounceOwnership, transferOwnership, setRoyaltyAddress, setSpiritRouter, updatePaintRouter, setBaseURI, setMintSize, sweepEthToAddress.

Make the owner a multi-sig and/or introduce a timelock for improved community oversight.

Ultimate Fantoms: Acknowledged, contract ownership will be changed to the multisig at

0x87f385d152944689f92Ed523e9e5E9Bd58Ea62ef.

publicMint relies on multiple external calls which can fail accidentally or deliberately. If just one consistently fails, users will not be able to mint.

Isolate external calls to another transaction(s). wFTM allocations could be distributed with a pull-over-push pattern.

Ultimate Fantoms: Acknowledged, failed transactions can be resubmitted + the chance of

a failed call is low.

The random function relies on weak sources of pseudo-randomness from only on-chain attributes. A validator node can manipulate the block.timestamp and therefore the random number. Therefore, the _sendTo address can be manipulated in favor of the validator.

Utilize the Randomness pattern to obtain on-chain randomness and avoid validator manipulation or obtain random numbers off-chain through an oracle.

Ultimate Fantoms: Acknowledged in source code.

In publicMint, when performing _earnTo = random() % (_tokenIdCounter.current() +1), there is a possibility _earnTo is equivalent to _tokenIdCounter.current() which yields a tokenID for a token that does not exist yet. Therefore, the subsequent call to ownerOf will fail and the mint will revert.

Perform random() % _tokenIdCounter.current().

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved, applied suggestion.

In the getPrice function the stepwise price jumps do not account for the following tokenIds: 101, 301, 601, 1001, 1501, and 2301.

This is because each if statement utilizes > instead of >= when referring to these tokenIds.Therefore a mint for one of these tokenIds will mistakenly go to the else branch and charge 6 FTM.

Use >= or decrement the lower boundaries by one.

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved, applied suggestion.

transfer() comes with a fixed amount of gas.

Utilize call() with a success check.

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved, applied suggestion.

On line 1712: // random number between 0 to 4 is inaccurate as _toEarn takes on a random value of 0 or 1.

Additionally, on line 1672: // 10% is inaccurate as _rndmAlloc is calculated to be 15%.

Refactor comments to accurately reflect the code.

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved, applied suggestion.

Several functions such as setMintFees, enableMinting, disableMinting, setTeamMinting, minterTeamMintsRemaining, and minterTeamMintsCount serve no purpose.

In addition, variables such as enableMinter, _earnAmount, _mintFees, _teamMintSize, RNDM_TOKEN, bePATH1, bePATH2, BEETS_TOKEN, bPath1, bPath2, BRUSH_TOKEN, SPIRITSWAP_TOKEN, wCYBERs, wFTMOPRs, OPR, _beetsAlloc, _treasuryAlloc, _dfyAlloc, and _teamMintCounter go unused.

Remove unused code.

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved, applied suggestion.

In publicMint the random function is called several times, even though the random value is constant during each tx.

Compute the random value once.

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved, applied suggestion.

Because the getPrice function is stepwise, anyone can mint 10 tokens as if they were all in a lower cost bracket while potentially only 1 was.

Compute the mint fee for each token, account for mints that traverse the fee increase, or accept the manipulation.

Ultimate Fantoms: Acknowledged, protocol loss will be minimal if exploited.

The owner address has permissions to arbitrarily setMintSize which can drastically affect the tokenomics of the project.

Remove the setMintSize function or appropriately timelock it for community trust and safety.

Ultimate Fantoms: Acknowledged, contract ownership will be changed to the multisig at

0x87f385d152944689f92Ed523e9e5E9Bd58Ea62ef.

In publicMint the rewards distribution to CYBERs holders can only occur on the first mint and never after.

Ensure this is the expected behavior. If it isn’t, refactor the reward logic to more fairly include CYBERs holders.

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved.

The _beetsAlloc, _dfyAlloc, _treasuryAlloc, mintFees, and _earnAmount variables are never modified, and should therefore be declared constant.

Declare them as constant.

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved, applied suggestion where appropriate.

The functions setRoyaltyAddress, updateSpiritRouter, updatePaintRouter, publicMint, setMintFees, enableMinting, disableMinting, setBaseURI, setTeamMinting, setMintSize, and sweepEthToAddress are marked as public, but are never called from inside the contract.

These functions can be marked external for gas optimization.

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved, applied suggestion where appropriate.

The _earnAmount variable goes unused.

Remove unused code.

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved, applied suggestion.

In the recieve and fallback functions, the rewards distribution to CYBERs holders can only occur before the second mint and never after.

Ensure this is the expected behavior. If it isn’t, refactor the reward logic to more fairly include CYBERs holders.

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved.

In the receive and fallback functions the random function is called several times, even though the random value is constant during each tx.

Compute the random value once.

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved, applied suggestion.

The SPIRITSWAP_ROUTER and _earnAmount variables are never modified, and should therefore be declared constant.

Declare them as constant.

Ultimate Fantoms: Resolved, applied suggestion where appropriate.