Portfolio · Findings database
Smart contract audit findings database
The database lists the findings from Guardian's public audit reports. Search by keyword, or narrow the list by severity, fix status, chain, sector, language, team or vulnerability class.
9,100+ findings from 300+ public reports, published from March 2022 to November 2026. Each one links to its place in the report.
The database in numbers
- Findings
- 9,100+
- Critical and high
- 1,100+
- Public reports
- 300+
- Teams
- 95+
Search
Search the findings
Showing 50 of 1,126 critical and high findings, most severe first
- Critical C-01 Omitted Lazer exponent inflates oracle price Resolved
- Critical C-02 Partial closes erase accrued fees Resolved
- Critical C-03 Exponentless Lazer updates let traders mint funding collateral and drain LP assets Resolved
- Critical C-04 Rounded DCA positions poison coin OI and enable a repeatable LP funding drain Resolved
- Critical C-01 YS vault depositors permanently stuck Resolved
- Critical C-01 Zero-For-One Tick Replay Can Skip Current Boundary Resolved
- Critical C-02 Dust maker liquidity hides residual exposure from OI and margin checks Resolved
- Critical C-01 Exposure increases bypass the initial margin requirement Acknowledged
- Critical C-02 Same-block mark manipulation enables profitable atomic self-liquidation Acknowledged
- Critical R1-C-01 Dust Pre-Seed Allows Full Liquidity Drain Resolved
- Critical C-01 Stale nextHeightAbove Causes Double Height Cross Acknowledged
- Critical C-01 Zero-Amount Cross Can Underflow Liquidity Acknowledged
- Critical C-01 Royalty Owner Can Steal Royalties Via Reentrancy Resolved
- Critical C-02 Splits Can Be Stolen Resolved
- Critical C-01 Anyone Can Takeover Pool And Corrupt State Resolved
- Critical C-02 Attacker Can Drain Arbitrary User Stake Resolved
- Critical C-03 Vault PDA Collision Enables Cross-Pool Theft Resolved
- Critical C-04 Vault Authority Takeover Resolved
- Critical C-05 Authority Hijacking In SOL Deposit Resolved
- Critical C-01 Orderbook Drained Due To Cancelled Orders Resolved
- Critical C-02 Anyone Can Replay The M0 Transfer Between Spokes Resolved
- Critical C-03 Cross Chain Orders Can Be Canceled From Source Resolved
- Critical C-01 Leverage Mistakes Debt As Yield Partially resolved
- Critical C-02 Incorrect Rounding Allows Price Collapse Resolved
- Critical C-03 Arbitrage Guards Bypassed Acknowledged
- Critical C-04 Withdrawing collateral without repaying debt Resolved
- Critical C-01 Liquidation Debt Leak Via Index Scaling Resolved
- Critical C-02 DoS Of Stability Pool Resolved
- Critical C-03 Delegation Index Drift Blocks Liquidation Resolved
- Critical C-04 Batch Liquidation Uses Stale Coll/Debt Indices Resolved
- Critical C-01 Double claiming of rewards via share transfers Resolved
- Critical C-01 Continuous Withdrawal DoS Resolved
- Critical C-01 Infinite refund vulnerability Acknowledged
- Critical C-02 closeOrder Fails to Update inputAmountRemaining Acknowledged
- Critical C-03 Reserves can be inflated without actual deposit Acknowledged
- Critical C-04 Executor spoofing causes users tokens draining Acknowledged
- Critical C-05 Fee Growth Misaccounting in Fixed Pools Acknowledged
- Critical C-06 Filled Orders Remain Cancelable in CLOB Acknowledged
- Critical C-07 Head close corrupts global currentPrice Acknowledged
- Critical C-08 Fixed Pool Height Pointer DOS Acknowledged
- Critical C-01 Non Head Order Closing Traps Maker Funds Resolved
- Critical C-02 Pricing Bounds Check Breaks Direct Swaps Resolved
- Critical C-03 Height List Corruption Breaks Swaps Resolved
- Critical C-01 All In-Flight Assets Stolen Resolved
- Critical C-01 Any Allowed Token Can Be Used Resolved
- Critical C-01 PredictionMarket Signatures Can Be Replayed Resolved
- Critical C-02 The Vault Available Assets Can Be Inflated Resolved
- Critical C-01 Sniping Risk Via Liquidity Cap Finalization Resolved
- Critical C-01 Reserve Withdrawal Unit Mismatch Resolved
- Critical C-01 Expired Orders Do Not Refund Tokens Resolved
Every finding is also on its report page. Browse the reports.
The data
What the findings show
By severity
- 320+Critical3%
- 800+High8%
- 2,000+Medium22%
- 3,900+Low43%
- 2,000+Informational22%
76% of the critical and high findings are marked resolved in their reports.
| Severity | Findings | Resolved | Partial | Acknowledged | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 320+ | 87% | 3% | 6% | 2% |
| High | 800+ | 71% | 4% | 18% | 5% |
| Medium | 2,000+ | 53% | 2% | 36% | 6% |
| Low | 3,900+ | 49% | 1% | 43% | 5% |
| Informational | 2,000+ | 42% | 1% | 48% | 7% |
By chain
| Chain | Reports | Findings | Critical and high |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arbitrum | 130+ | 4,000+ | 600+ |
| Ethereum | 120+ | 3,700+ | 410+ |
| Base | 60+ | 2,600+ | 310+ |
| Avalanche | 45+ | 1,100+ | 180+ |
| Optimism | 45+ | 1,300+ | 150+ |
| Polygon | 30+ | 640+ | 50+ |
| Hyperliquid | 30+ | 520+ | 40+ |
| BNB Chain | 25+ | 570+ | 60+ |
| Monad | 15+ | 240+ | 8 |
| Ink | 10+ | 95+ | 0 |
| Solana | 10+ | 400+ | 25+ |
| Blast | 10+ | 250+ | 60+ |
By sector
| Sector | Reports | Findings | Critical and high |
|---|---|---|---|
| Perpetuals | 75+ | 2,700+ | 400+ |
| Stablecoins | 50+ | 700+ | 15+ |
| Infrastructure | 25+ | 660+ | 40+ |
| DEXs and AMMs | 25+ | 1,300+ | 210+ |
| Cross-chain | 20+ | 410+ | 10+ |
| Token launches | 20+ | 590+ | 130+ |
| Yield and vaults | 20+ | 910+ | 150+ |
| Lending | 20+ | 730+ | 90+ |
| Derivatives | 15+ | 970+ | 100+ |
| Tokens | 15+ | 430+ | 25+ |
| Staking | 10+ | 510+ | 45+ |
| AMM hooks | 10+ | 630+ | 85+ |
| NFTs | 10+ | 220+ | 15+ |
By vulnerability class
| Class | Findings | Critical and high |
|---|---|---|
| Access control | 140+ | 35+ |
| Oracles and price feeds | 230+ | 20+ |
| Reentrancy | 70+ | 8 |
| Rounding and precision | 260+ | 25+ |
| Signatures and replay | 100+ | 6 |
| Liquidations | 260+ | 65+ |
| Slippage, front-running and MEV | 200+ | 40+ |
| Upgrades and initialization | 80+ | 4 |
| Accounting errors | 70+ | 20+ |
| Input validation | 960+ | 70+ |
| Denial of service and griefing | 690+ | 160+ |
By language
| Language | Reports | Findings |
|---|---|---|
| Solidity | 270+ | 8,500+ |
| Rust | 15+ | 470+ |
| TypeScript | 5 | 190+ |
| Soroban | 4 | 25+ |
| JavaScript | 3 | 25+ |
| DAML | 2 | 100+ |
Method
About this data
- Each finding is shown as its published report records it: ID, title, severity and the team's response. The report PDF in the GuardianAudits repository is the version of record.
- Status is the response recorded when the report was published. A fix shipped later may not be reflected.
- Chains and sectors follow the portfolio's tags for each report. A report tagged with several counts toward each of them.
- Vulnerability classes come from fixed rules over the report's own category and the finding's title. In a hand check of a random sample, 95% were classed correctly. Findings the rules cannot place are filed under Other.
- The database updates when a new public report is published. The latest is dated November 11, 2026.
- To cite it: Guardian Security, Smart contract audit findings database, https://guardian.security/portfolio/findings/
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