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Every chain USDT0 reached, we checked before it got there.

USDT0 is the omnichain deployment of the largest stablecoin in the world. Since January 2025 Guardian has run more than fifty engagements on it (the code, the deployments, the multisig, and the offchain infrastructure) and holds 33 of the reports in Tether and Everdawn’s own public audit repository.

50+Engagements since Jan 2025
33Reports in the client’s own repo
$150BVolume
25+Chains, incl. Solana and Stellar

Guardian has been continuously embedded in Tether’s omnichain rollout for twenty months, and the work spans deployments on over 25 chains and extensive offchain infrastructure.

Why Guardian

USDT0 needed more than smart contract coverage. First, world-class onchain security for the OFT architecture every deployment inherits. Then operational assurance: independent review of every queued Safe transaction, deployment and wiring change, and advice on who should hold authority over it all. And offchain auditing of the front end, the relayers and the client stack that sit between users and the contracts.

Few firms cover all three. That is what made Guardian the fit.

“We very much appreciate Guardian’s approach to security and the entire audit process. Guardian goes above and beyond to not only do manual audits but also contribute to verification processes and helps for the entire development pipeline to improve.”
Core Team USDT0 · supplied to Guardian

The engagements

More than fifty engagements do not fit on one page, so what follows are the milestones: the reviews that changed what shipped. The rail alongside tracks where you are in the sequence.

Jan 2025

The first review: core OFT architecture

OAdapterUpgradeable · OUpgradeable · TetherTokenOFTExtension

The first engagement was the architecture itself: the upgradeable adapter and token extension every later USDT0, XAUT0, USAT and CNHT0 deployment would inherit. It caught missing storage gaps and upgrade-safety violations before the pattern was copied chain by chain.

USDT0’s documentation still links this report as the Guardian audit.

Why it mattered

These contracts now run four Tether assets on dozens of chains. A storage-layout defect fixed once in January 2025 never had to be fixed forty times.

Read the report →
Jan 2025

Arbitrum: migrating a whole chain's supply in flight

Migration logic · upgrade triggers · pause/resume · production rehearsal · 5 auditors

Arbitrum’s entire USDT supply moved to the USDT0 architecture in this migration. Guardian verified the migration logic and pause flows and ran a full production rehearsal with the real deployment parameters. The rehearsal found what reading the contracts would not have.

Highlighted finding · L-03, resolved

Users bridging Ethereum→Arbitrum through the legacy gateway just before the cutover would have been unable to recover their funds, since the migrated side could no longer credit USDT via bridgeMint. Guardian recommended setting l1Address to address(0) so the gateway’s refund path returns funds after seven days, and deactivating the Ethereum gateway so the window cannot reopen.

Read the report →
Feb 2025

Multihop

Multi-leg transfer orchestration · gas refund paths

The multihop contract chains transfers across several legs in one call. Guardian found it could trap funds outright, not because of the orchestration, but because of USDT itself.

Highlighted finding

USDT on Ethereum does not return a boolean from approve(), contrary to ERC-20, so the spec-compliant contract reverted and trapped funds mid-route. The fix matched USDT’s actual behaviour rather than its declared one.

Read the report →
Mar 2025

HyperLiquid Composer

Bridging layer between HyperEVM and HyperLiquid L1

Moving USDT0 between HyperEVM and HyperLiquid’s L1 crosses a boundary with its own execution semantics. Guardian threat-modelled the composer against HyperLiquid’s system calls, where the failure modes are not those of a normal bridge.

Read the report →
Mar 2025

OneSig: the multisig behind everything

Cross-chain multisig · replay, reentrancy, MEV, nonces

OneSig is Tether’s cross-chain multisig, the contract with authority over the deployments.

Highlighted finding

The contract’s identifier was not bound to the chain ID, so a signed transaction could be replayed on a forked chain to execute privileged actions twice. Guardian recommended binding it to the chain.

Read the report →
Mar 2025

Superchain deployment and IERC7802 interop

DVN configuration · permit path · fallback logic · IERC7802

Guardian found that a change to the permit domain separator would silently invalidate signatures users had already issued, a break that only surfaces when a signed approval stops working. The review also covered USDT0’s adoption of IERC7802, the Superchain interop standard.

It recorded that no DVNs were yet deployed for USDT on Optimism or Unichain: a correct contract with missing configuration, which is the thesis of this whole engagement.

Read the report →
May 2025

Polygon upgrade: two teams on the migration itself

USDT→USDT0 migration on Polygon · two independent Guardian teams

The Polygon migration itself, reviewed by two independent teams whose findings were merged into a single set.

Read the report →
Aug 2025

Polygon: the deployment playbook that would have unbacked the supply

Polygon deployment · peer verification · migration transactions

The clearest case for deployment verification as its own discipline: the contracts were fine, the playbook was not. The queued migration sent USDT from Polygon’s ERC20Predicate to a multisig instead of the OAdapter that backs circulating USDT0.

Highlighted finding · I-01, resolved before execution

In Guardian’s words, the plan “will create an insolvency case, as there will be more USDT0 circulating in LayerZero chains than the amount of USDT available in the OAdapter to be redeemed.” Filed as Informational and fixed before the transactions ran.

Read the report →
2025 – 2026

Solana: a second virtual machine

XAUT0 SOL deployment and peer verification · USDT0 Solana transaction verification

Taking XAUT0 to Solana meant leaving the EVM: program authorities instead of contract ownership, but the same risk that a misconfigured peer leaves an unbacked supply. Guardian verified the deployment and its peers, then USDT0’s Solana transactions. The deployment report is public.

Read the report →
2025–2026

The cadence: every chain, every wiring, every config change

Flare · Sei · Rootstock · XLayer · Plasma · Celo · Hedera · Mantle · Monad · MegaETH · Tempo · and more

Most of the relationship is volume work: deployment reviews, peer verifications, wiring checks and config changes, each a chance to connect a correct contract to the wrong counterparty. Guardian verified network exits too, such as the Corn delisting, and reviewed what Ethereum’s Glamsterdam gas repricing meant for USDT0.

Most of it is public: over a dozen chains have a Guardian deployment report in the client’s repository.

Browse the chain-by-chain reports →
Nov 2025 – Jan 2026

Hedera: auditing the chain, not just the contract

50,784 lines of Java across 588 files · HTSConnectorUpgradeable.sol

Hedera has no ERC-20s; its token service lives in the consensus node itself, so trusting a USDT0 connector meant reviewing the node. Two teams read 50,784 lines of Java across the token, smart-contract and utility services over six weeks, the largest scope in the account.

Read the connector report →
Dec 2025

Off the chain: the front end and the signer service

Penetration test of the USDT0 web properties · LayerZero Gasolina signer/relayer review · API pentest

In December the scope left Solidity entirely: a penetration test of the USDT0 web properties, and a review of Gasolina, the off-chain signer and relayer service, including its API. A stablecoin with sound contracts and a compromised relayer is not a secure stablecoin.

Dec 2025

USAT: byte-exact verification of a regulated stablecoin

Ethereum mainnet + Sepolia · bytecode verification · 62-test fork suite

USAT, Tether’s US-regulated stablecoin, is the template for deployment verification: proxy, implementation and admin bytecode matched byte-exact on both networks, ownership confirmed, and a 62-test fork suite over blocklist, permit, mint and redeem paths, all passing. Its reconfiguration and Avalanche rollout came back to Guardian in 2026.

Read the report →
Jan – Aug 2026

The whole client stack, eight rounds deep

A review of the full client stack, web, desktop and API, for authentication, key handling and business-logic enforcement, modelled on real abuse cases like a compromised client or a malicious wallet. Eight rounds between January and August 2026.

Aug 2026

Stellar: a third virtual machine

Rust/Soroban OFT contracts · SAC manager · dual independent teams

USDT0 on Stellar meant Rust on Soroban, a third virtual machine. Two independent teams reviewed the OFT contracts and SAC manager in parallel, and the deployment review verified the WASM hashes on chain.

Read the deployment review →

Third-party resources

Every link below was fetched and checked. Guardian is named on the client’s own documentation and holds the large majority of the reports in the client’s own public repository.

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