Wagyu XMR1 Hack: Deployer Key Blamed on Host Breach
Part of our guide to multisig best practices

Quick answer. On November 20, 2026, XMR1's deployer account moved 5.2 million tokens to a new account that sold $13.51 million to 420 Hyperliquid buyers. XMR1 fell about 99.8%. Wagyu's operator blames a breach at Icelandic host 1984 and promises refunds.
Video transcript
On November 20, XMR1's deployer account on Hyperliquid sent 5.2 million tokens to a new account. Wagyu's operator blames a hosting breach.
That account sold to 420 buyers for 13.51 million dollars, Bitquery counted. XMR1 fell about 99.8 percent, but Monero's native coin was not hit.
The seller's address was first funded with 0.098 ETH from Tornado Cash. Through Arbitrum and CoW Protocol, proceeds were bridged to Ethereum. Checks found 7,348 ETH in three wallets.
Wagyu's operator alleges a breach at host 1984 exposed the deployer key in files from a deleted server. 1984 and CERT-IS confirmed a sophisticated attack, without mentioning Wagyu.
Onchain data shows the deployer key signed the transfers. It does not show where the key came from.
Three questions stayed open on November 21. Refunds had no date or verified payouts. The same deployer held 99.97 percent of ZEC1 at Bitquery's November 20 check. And Wagyu gave no restart time.
If the operator is right, the key outlived its server. Deleting a machine does not revoke a key. Any retained copy keeps full signing power.
Before trusting a relaunch, ask for evidence: the old key stripped of every role, every token it deployed reviewed, new keys off rented servers, and published refund transactions.
Read the full article for the timeline and sources, or ask Guardian to pentest the path from your hosts to your signing systems.
What Happened
On November 20, 2026, the account that deployed XMR1 on Hyperliquid sent 5.2 million tokens to a new account in three transfers, Bitquery traced.[1]
XMR1 fell from about $500 to about $1 in roughly 30 minutes, a drop of about 99.8%.[2]
Between 04:49 and 10:28 UTC, 369,623 XMR1 were sold to 420 buyers for $13.51 million, Bitquery counted.
The seller's address was first funded with 0.098 ETH from Tornado Cash. That fits an outside attacker but does not prove one, Bitquery says.
All times below are UTC on November 20, from Bitquery's trace of Hyperliquid and the operator's posts.
| Time (UTC) | Event |
|---|---|
| 03:30 | Seller's address funded with 0.098 ETH from Tornado Cash |
| 04:46 to 05:16 | Deployer sends 5.2 million XMR1 to the new account |
| 04:49 | First sale |
| 04:54 to 05:20 | USDC withdrawn to Arbitrum in 11 transfers |
| 09:36 | PerpetualCow says the cause is unclear |
| 10:28 | Last sale in Bitquery's count |
| 11:31 | Refunds promised |
| 12:48 | Post-mortem blames a breach at host 1984 |
| 13:16 | No refund transfers found to the ten largest buyers |
Where the Proceeds Went
The seller moved $13.28 million in USDC from Hyperliquid to Arbitrum.[1, 2]
On Arbitrum, $13.22 million was swapped through CoW Protocol for 7,467 ETH.
Of that, 6,929 ETH was bridged out through Socket, routed via Mayan and Stargate. About 6,810 ETH arrived on Ethereum after bridge costs.
At Bitquery's latest checks, 7,348 ETH sat across three wallets. The largest held 4,836 ETH and had never sent a transaction.
Bitquery's Ethereum data ran to 12:38 UTC and its Arbitrum data to 13:03 UTC on November 20.
At 05:54 UTC on November 21, Coindaro found the 7,348 ETH unchanged. The seller also still held about 4.82 million XMR1 and $224,000 in USDC on Hyperliquid.[3]
These are point-in-time readings, so later moves, freezes or recoveries would not appear.
What Wagyu Says
PerpetualCow, who runs Wagyu, first said the cause was unclear. He said market makers took most of the hit and swap users lost nothing.[1, 2]
He later promised to reimburse losses personally and to relaunch Wagyu.[4]
His post-mortem alleged that 1984.hosting, the Icelandic web host Wagyu used, had been breached. He said files kept from an old server he had deleted still held the XMR1 deployer key.
That link rests on his account. Onchain data proves the deployer key signed the transfers, not where the key came from, and Bitquery could not establish how it was obtained or who controlled it.
What 1984 and CERT-IS Confirmed
1984 ehf and CERT-IS, Iceland's national cyber response team, issued a joint statement on November 20. It described a serious, well-organized and technically sophisticated attack on 1984's systems.[5]
1984 temporarily stopped all services while the scope was investigated. DNS and email were to return first under special monitoring, and other services only after security checks.
1984's status page, last updated at 20:10 UTC on November 20, showed partially degraded service, with mixed indicators across hosting, email and nameservers.[6]
CERT-IS chief Magni R. Sigurdsson told mbl.is the attack was highly sophisticated and apparently used AI to map 1984's infrastructure, Daily Northern reported. He said leads existed but gave no attacker details.[7]
1984's managing director told RÚV the attack affected tens of thousands of customers and front-end services.[8]
He said 1984 was investigating with CERT-IS and Fjarskiptastofa, Iceland's electronic communications authority.
Neither the joint statement nor the interview gives a final data-theft assessment or mentions Wagyu, retained deleted-server files or XMR1 keys.
What XMR1 Holders Face
XMR1 is a wrapped Monero token traded on Hyperliquid. Users send Monero to Wagyu's bridge to receive XMR1, which is meant to be redeemable for Monero.[1, 2]
The collapse hit XMR1, not Monero's native coin or its chain.
Coindaro found no Hyperliquid statement in the November 20 coverage it reviewed. It reported the markets still quoting, with no XMR1 halt, delisting or validator action.[3]
On November 21, Hyperliquid's status page showed all systems operational and no XMR1 notice. A HyperAcademy snapshot at 09:01 UTC still listed the XMR1/USDC market as live.[9, 10]
Before the drain, the deployer account held 18.6 million XMR1, about 93% of the supply, Bitquery found. Whoever held that key could flood the market.
How much Monero backs the XMR1 still outstanding cannot be read from Hyperliquid, Arbitrum or Ethereum data. Monero-side activity sits outside Bitquery's trace.
Bitquery traced about $6.6 million of XMR1 purchases this month to four other hacks, including the Across domain hijack and the Lighter exploit. Nothing onchain ties those thieves to this drain, Bitquery says.
The Lighter proceeds accounted for about $3.5 million of that, and a Safe wallet drain on November 16 for about $1.9 million.
What Is Still Unknown
These points were still open in the latest reports, from early November 21.[3, 11]
- Whether refunds have started. At 03:04 UTC on November 21, Wagyu had published no payment date, eligibility rules or verified payout record.
- Whether other tokens under the same key are exposed. The deployer held 99.97% of ZEC1's supply at 13:16 UTC on November 20.[1]
- Whether Wagyu restarts. Its homepage showed temporary unavailability with no restart time, and no redemptions since the selloff had been verified.[12]
Guardian Analysis: Deleted Is Not Revoked
If the operator's account is right, the key outlived the server it sat on. Deleting a machine does not revoke a key; only moving its authority onchain does.
Any copy in a snapshot, backup or retained file keeps full signing power. A host's retention policy then becomes part of your key management.
Rotation must land everywhere the old key is trusted. In Guardian's FastLane Labs ShMonad Updates review, finding L-02 showed an old validator key could still change reward settings after rotation, via a cached copy awaiting manual sync.[13]
Our key rotation best practices guide covers moving roles off a retired key, and our private key incident runbook covers containment and root cause.
Checks Before Trusting a Relaunch
Holders and integrators should ask for evidence, not promises. These checks apply to any wrapped asset relaunching after a key compromise.
- Old deployer key emptied and stripped of every role, with transactions anyone can verify.
- Every token the old key deployed reviewed, not only the one that was drained.
- New keys generated on clean hardware and kept off rented servers.
- Ownership, minting and transfer rights read onchain from a second source.
- Refund transactions published, with the eligibility rule and amounts per account.
- Native reserves matched against outstanding wrapped supply, with addresses or proofs others can check.
- The leak path named: which host, backup or retained file held the key, and who could read it.
- For teams: an inventory of every host, vendor and backup that has ever held key material.
Test the path from your host to your keys
Guardian's infrastructure pentest tests whether compromised cloud accounts, deployment pipelines or vendor access could let an attacker reach your signing systems.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who absorbed most of the XMR1 losses?
Bitquery found that 75% of the sale proceeds came from buy orders already resting on the book, which it attributes to market makers. One account paid $3.56 million through a resting order, while 243 buyers paid under $1,000 each.[1]
When did the attack on 1984 begin?
1984's managing director, Mörður Áslaugarson, told RÚV the attack began the previous week and had been escalating since. Bitquery notes the joint statement gives no time for the break-in, so when any key could have been copied is not established.[1, 8, 14]
Which other tokens did the XMR1 deployer launch?
Bitquery links the same account to ZEC1, a Zcash token, and to TAO1 and TRX1, where it held the full supply. It also deployed a token called MAX. Bitquery saw no movement in any of them before its cutoff.[1]
Did any stolen XMR1 go back to Monero?
Possibly. Between 04:47 and 04:53 UTC, 6,000 XMR1 went to seven other accounts. Four forwarded theirs within about 30 seconds to one address Bitquery flags as a possible swap service sweep.[1]
Related reading
- lighter api key nonce reuse exploit
- mixin hack explained
- private key compromised runbook
- crypto key rotation
- is hyperliquid safe
Sources
- Bitquery: XMR1 Hack: $13.5M Taken From 420 Hyperliquid Buyers
- Cointelegraph: Wrapped Monero token crashes 99.8% amid suspected $13.5M exploit
- Coindaro: XMR1 hack: wrapped Monero falls 99% on Hyperliquid
- PerpetualCow (Wagyu operator): PerpetualCow XMR1 post-mortem announcement
- DV: 1984 ehf. suspends services after serious cyberattack
- 1984 Hosting: 1984 Hosting Status
- Daily Northern: CERT-IS describes 1984 cyberattack as highly sophisticated
- RÚV: Serious cyberattack thought backed by wealthy operators
- Hyperliquid: Hyperliquid Status
- HyperAcademy: XMR1/USDC Spot Price, Market Cap & Volume on Hyperliquid
- Daily Crypto Briefs: Wagyu Pledges Refunds After $13.5M XMR1 Sell-Off
- Wagyu: Wagyu Swap
- Guardian: ShMonad Updates, finding L-02: Revoked validator auth still settles rewards
- RÚV: Glíma 1984 við tölvuárás eins og að berjast við björn
- UnderHyper: Hyperliquid News