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Polter Finance Hack Explained: A Spot-Price Oracle Flaw

By Daniel GelfandPublished 5 min read

Part of our guide to smart contract vulnerabilities

Polter Finance Hack Explained: A Spot-Price Oracle Flaw

Quick answer. In the Polter Finance hack on November 16, 2024, an attacker flash-borrowed BOO from the SpookySwap pools Polter used for pricing, inflating BOO's spot price. One deposited BOO then let the attacker borrow assets that DefiLlama values at about $8.7 million.

Watch: Polter Finance Hack Explained: A Spot-Price Oracle Flaw 1:39
Video transcript

One deposited BOO token drained Polter Finance's Fantom markets on November 16, 2024. The protocol trusted a price the attacker could move.

Rekt reports the attacker flash-borrowed BOO from the SpookySwap pools Polter used for pricing. The drained pools quoted BOO at a hugely inflated price. One deposited BOO, CertiK and SolidityScan report, then backed borrowing far beyond its market worth.

DefiLlama and Rekt put the loss at about 8.7 million dollars. The founder's police report gave a higher valuation. These are separate estimates of one incident, not losses to add.

A spot price is just the current ratio of a pool's reserves. Whoever moves the reserves sets the price, at least for one transaction.

Polter had disabled its own flash loans. That removed one funding source, not the attack, because the borrowed BOO came from the priced pools themselves.

Guardian recorded the same mechanism in its December 2023 review of Ambit Finance's lending platform. The finding was rated Low and is marked resolved, with time-weighted pricing recommended.

No single control is enough. Never use an instantaneous pool price alone. Size any time-weighted window to liquidity, bound prices, cap borrowing per asset, and keep a fast pause.

An upstream audit covers inherited code, not your own listings or oracle adapters. Read the full article, or talk to Guardian about a lending protocol audit.

Why This Case Matters

Polter Finance was a lending protocol built from Geist Finance contracts, where depositors earned a share of borrowers' interest. It launched on Base in September 2024; the November 2024 exploit hit its Fantom markets.[1, 2, 3]

Its Fantom pools were drained through one collateral price. The protocol accepted a pool's live BOO price as truth, and an attacker moved that price.[4]

For a lending team, the lesson is narrow and concrete. Every listed asset's price path is part of your solvency.

What Happened

DefiLlama, CertiK and SolidityScan all date the exploit to November 16, 2024. DefiLlama classifies it as spot-price oracle manipulation.[2, 5, 6]

Rekt reports that the attacker flash-borrowed BOO out of SpookySwap V2 and V3 pools. Polter relied on those pools to value BOO.[4]

Drained of BOO, the pools quoted it at a hugely inflated price. Polter took that quote as the value of BOO collateral.

CertiK and SolidityScan put the deposit at one BOO token. Valued at the distorted price, it supported borrowing far beyond its market worth.

The attacker borrowed against it and kept the proceeds.

  • November 16, 2024: the exploit. SolidityScan identifies the attack transaction as 0x5118df23e81603a64c7676dd6b6e4f76a57e4267e67507d34b0b26dd9ee10eac on Fantom.
  • November 17: Polter says it has paused the platform, notified bridges and traced the attacker's wallets to Binance.[7]
  • November 17: Polter announces onchain outreach to the exploiter.
  • November 18: Rekt publishes its account, putting the loss at about $8.7 million.
  • November 18: crypto.news reports Polter is working with Security Alliance to identify the attacker and recover funds.[8]
  • February 2025: FailSafe announces a partnership and says Polter plans to relaunch on Sonic and Base.[9]
  • By May 9, 2025: FailSafe's case study says Polter announced its relaunch on Sonic and Base.[10]
  • November 20, 2026: DefiLlama tracks about $11.8K TVL: Fantom $9.7K, Base $2.2K, Sonic $0. Tracker balances, not proof of operation.

The Polter Finance Vulnerability

A pool's spot price is just the current ratio of its reserves. Whoever moves the reserves sets the price, at least for one transaction.[11]

Uniswap's v2 whitepaper flags this risk for contracts that read pool prices. Its answer is a time-weighted average price (TWAP), built from cumulative prices over an interval.

A longer interval makes the average more expensive to manipulate, the whitepaper notes. It also makes the price less current.

Turning off Polter's own flash loans removed one funding source, not the attack. Rekt's account has the borrowed BOO coming from the very pools being priced.[1, 4]

Our explainer on flash loan attacks covers other cases where borrowed capital scaled a pricing bug.

For the general mechanics, our guide to oracle manipulation attacks works through a lending exploit with numbers and covers TWAP limits.

How Much Was Lost

Two loss figures circulate. They are separate valuations of one incident, not losses to add together.[2, 4, 8]

None of these sources publishes an asset-by-asset reconciliation, so the gap between the figures is unexplained.

SourceFigureBasis
DefiLlamaAbout $8.7 millionIncident database estimate, read November 20, 2026
RektAbout $8.7 millionReporting published November 18, 2024
Police report, via crypto.newsOver S$16.1 million, about US$11.98 millionFounder Whichghost's valuation, converted by crypto.news

Polter's Response

Polter's claim to have traced the attacker's wallets to Binance is its own statement; these sources publish no independent tracing result or freeze.[7]

crypto.news reported an offer to negotiate a bounty and not pursue legal action if the funds came back. Such an offer is not binding legal immunity.[8]

How these offers are usually structured, from bounty size to deadlines and sanctions checks, is in our guide to negotiating with a hacker after a DeFi exploit.

No verified recovery or reimbursement figure was found for this article. That is a gap in the record, not proof that nothing was recovered.

The Same Pattern in an Audit

Guardian's December 2023 review of Ambit Finance's lending platform recorded the same mechanism as UNIPO-1, Uniswap Oracle Manipulation.[12]

One Ambit oracle priced assets from a Uniswap pool's reserve ratio. A flash loan could skew those reserves, inflate collateral value and raise borrowing limits.

The finding was rated Low and is marked Resolved. Guardian recommended pricing from the Uniswap TWAP instead of the reserves.

Controls That Stop It

Chainlink's feed guidance leaves application safeguards to developers. For single-source feeds it lists bounds, caps, freshness checks, circuit breakers, fallbacks and manual pauses.[13]

No single control is enough. Layer them so a bad price is hard to create and cheap to survive.

The list below covers the price path only. Our lending protocol audit checklist adds 40 checks across collateral, interest, liquidations, permissions and integrations.

  • Never use an instantaneous pool price, such as a reserve ratio or slot0, as a standalone collateral price.
  • If you use a TWAP, size its window against the pool's liquidity and the cost of holding a moved price.
  • Check each feed's liquidity and source dependence before listing an asset as collateral.
  • Bound every price: reject readings that stray too far from an independent reference, where one exists.
  • Cap supply and borrowing per collateral asset to its real market depth.
  • Never fall back to the same pool or dependency the primary price uses.
  • Keep a fast pause on borrowing against one asset, with repayments left open.
  • Model attackers with near-unlimited single-transaction capital, whether or not your pool offers flash loans.
  • Scope audits to listings, oracle adapters, fallbacks and deployed parameters.

Get Your Collateral Pricing Reviewed

Guardian's lending protocol audits cover oracles, liquidations, bad debt and forks, with an invariant suite that stays with your code. Bring your listings and oracle adapters into scope.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was Polter Finance audited?

Polter's audit page offered Geist Finance's audit reports. It said its contracts matched Geist's except for the removed flash-loan function. That covers inherited code, not Polter's own asset listings or oracle configuration.[14]

Would a TWAP alone have stopped the Polter Finance exploit?

The Polter attack was flash-funded, so the borrowed BOO had to return inside the single transaction SolidityScan identifies. A TWAP built from cumulative prices does not record a spike set and reversed inside one transaction. That blunts this specific route.[5, 6, 11]

Sources

  1. Polter Finance: Polter Finance: Overview
  2. DefiLlama: Polter Finance: Protocol Information and Hacks
  3. Chainwire: Polter.Finance is now live on Base Chain bringing Polter and its $GEIST tech to a new audience.
  4. Rekt: Polter Finance
  5. CertiK: Polter Finance Incident Analysis (November 18, 2024)
  6. SolidityScan: Polter Finance Hack Analysis
  7. Coinlive: Massive Exploit Forces Polter Finance to Shut Down Temporarily After Devastating Hack Drains Funds, Recovery Efforts Underway
  8. crypto.news: Polter Finance kicks off recovery efforts following $12m flash loan attack
  9. FailSafe: Singapore-Based Polter Finance Upgrades to FailSafe’s Runtime Security After $8.7M DeFi Exploit
  10. FailSafe: How Polter Finance Reinforced Security After an $8.7M Exploit
  11. Uniswap: Uniswap v2 Core
  12. Guardian: Ambit Finance: Borrowing and Lending Platform, UNIPO-1
  13. Chainlink: Selecting Quality Data Feeds
  14. Polter Finance: Polter Finance: Audit
  15. Guardian: Smart Contract Audit Services