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Optimizely Supply Chain Attack: Checks for Crypto Teams

By Daniel GelfandPublished 6 min read

Part of our guide to Web3 penetration testing

Optimizely Supply Chain Attack: Checks for Crypto Teams

Quick answer. On November 16, 2026, an attacker abused an Optimizely signup flaw to inject a skimmer that swapped wallet addresses and targeted card data. Report URI saw it on 178 organizations' sites, including Ledger. Teams should review transfer pages, CSP reports and that day's transactions.

Watch: Optimizely Supply Chain Attack: Checks for Crypto Teams 1:46
Video transcript

On November 16, 2026, an Optimizely signup flaw let an attacker push a wallet-swapping skimmer onto customer websites.

Posing as existing users, the attacker inserted JavaScript into customer projects. It reached visitors through their normal Optimizely snippets, mostly from Optimizely's own CDN.

Report URI found 188 infected snippets tied to 178 organizations, and says the real number could be higher.

The payload swapped crypto addresses in pages, forms and the clipboard. It also captured card details, and tried exploit kits on older iPhones.

A swapped address needs no stolen key. The user signs a valid transfer to the wrong destination. Report URI's crypto set includes Ledger, but that alone does not show lost funds.

Of 256 hosts Report URI checked, 24 blocked the payload. In 17, it ran but could not send data out, which still allows an in-page swap.

Confirm your exposure window with your Optimizely Customer Success Manager. Map pages the snippet ran on, transfer pages first. Search logs for the published indicators, review that day's transactions, and tighten CSP where funds move.

This is Guardian analysis, not a finding about any affected site. Any destination that page code can rewrite should be confirmed against a server-side record and the signing device.

Guardian's pentests cover third-party scripts, transfer flows and client-side attacks. Read the full article, or ask us about your deposit and withdrawal pages.

What Happened

On November 16, 2026, an attacker exploited a flaw in the account signup flow of Optimizely Web Experimentation. It let them act as existing users on customer accounts.[1, 2]

Acting as those users, they inserted JavaScript into the Project JavaScript of selected customer projects. Optimizely says no Optimizely administrator account was breached and no customer passwords were stolen.[3]

The code reached visitors through each customer's normal Optimizely snippet, mostly served from Optimizely's own CDN under its certificate. Customer web servers did not need to be compromised.[4, 5]

Report URI examined 1,611 snippets and found 188 infected ones tied to 178 organizations.

This explainer follows Optimizely's November 17 report, its status page and independent research. All times are UTC.

Timeline

Optimizely's times come from its application logs. Report URI's first sighting comes from outside observation, and the gap to 07:51 is unresolved.[1, 4]

When (UTC)Event
Nov 16, 00:37First impersonated account created through the signup flow
Nov 16, 04:21Report URI's first observed infected snippet
Nov 16, 07:51First malicious code write in Optimizely's logs
Nov 16, 13:34Optimizely detects the activity
Nov 16, 16:06Optimizely applies a Cloudflare block
Nov 16, 16:10 to 16:53Signup flaw remediated, then impersonated sessions ended and tokens revoked
Nov 16, 22:24Injected code removed from all affected projects
Nov 16, 23:11Report URI observes all infected files cleaned
Nov 17, 01:02Status page notice confirms the exploited vulnerability
Nov 17Optimizely publishes initial customer report
Nov 17Bitquery publishes onchain loss tracing
Nov 18Sri Lanka CERT publishes its advisory

What the Script Did

The payload swapped cryptocurrency addresses in page text, form fields, the clipboard and outgoing requests. Optimizely says it targeted transfers by replacing the destination wallet ID.[1, 4, 5, 6]

It ran on load with no page restrictions, polling every 50 milliseconds and watching DOM changes and clipboard events.

It also captured card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs typed into on-page forms. Hosted payment iframes such as Stripe or Adyen were out of reach.

On pages where it swapped an address, it could send readable cookies, the page URL and a screenshot to the attacker.

Optimizely says that on iOS and iPadOS 18.6 and lower, it loaded a second stage. Unit 42 says it tried to deliver the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits.

Optimizely's PCI CDN, cdn-pci.optimizely.com, was included too. The injection path bypassed the protections around it.

Why Crypto Pages Matter

A swapped address needs no stolen key. The user signs a valid transfer to the wrong destination.

Optimizely rates affected sites as high risk where crypto transfers ran in forms with the snippet and no strong CSP.[1]

Report URI's crypto and trading set comprises Ledger, IG, OANDA/Coinpass, interactive investor, TMS Brokers and Betashares.[4]

That list shows where infected snippets were seen. It does not show that any of these firms ran the snippet on a transfer page, or that users lost funds.

On November 17, Ledger Donjon said Optimizely was a third-party service on ledger.com, the issue was remediated and the malicious code was no longer served.[7, 8]

It said the security architecture of Ledger devices was unaffected and private keys remain protected by the device. It did not say which pages ran the code or when it was removed.

Report URI observed Ledger's snippet clean at about 20:41 on November 16.

No package or build was involved: the malicious changes sat in Project JavaScript, which the CDN relayed. Our guide to dApp frontend supply chain security covers the npm route instead.

Our Polymarket third-party script attack explainer shows another vendor route into the same page-level trust.

Confirmed and Still Open

Optimizely says the incident is contained, and no malicious code remained in its systems from 22:24 on November 16.[1, 2]

As of 13:01 on November 18, its status page still listed the incident as Monitoring, with no update after 01:02 on November 17.[9]

The Mandiant forensic investigation is ongoing.

Only Web Experimentation was affected. Feature Experimentation, the SDKs and legacy Full Stack were not.

Report URI's November 17 update lists about $7,151 in attacker wallet receipts. About $5,489 of it was BTC.[4]

The rest was about $760 in LTC, $719 in TRON assets, $101 in ETH and $82 in BSC USDT.

Bitquery's November 17 onchain review counts about $2,260 in victim payments across 19 transfers. It says earlier totals included about $4,920 the attacker swapped into BTC itself.[10]

Report URI says the attacker emptied the wallets early on November 17, partly to an address it had used to cash out earlier operations.

Optimizely says it can see when the injected code loaded, not whether data left the page. These points remain open:

  • How many visitors loaded the injected code.
  • How many card captures or crypto thefts succeeded, and how much was taken.
  • The final root cause, final IOC list and attribution.
  • Each customer's exposure window, which Optimizely shares only through Customer Success Managers.
  • The full number of affected organizations; Report URI says it could exceed 178.

What CSP Stopped

Report URI checked Content Security Policy on 256 hosts belonging to affected organizations.[4]

Its four published outcome groups cover 159 of those hosts. The other 97 are not explained.[11]

The 17 middle cases matter for crypto. Blocking exfiltration does not stop a swap that happens inside the page.

Allowlisting cdn.optimizely.com could not stop the loader, because it arrived from that host.

Optimizely says the skimmer itself loaded from an outside domain, so a strong CSP would have blocked it.[1]

Report URI names 'strict-dynamic' and 'unsafe-eval' as settings that undermined otherwise useful policies.

CSP outcomeHosts
Payload blocked24
Payload ran, connect-src blocked exfiltration17
Policy allowed payload and theft50
No CSP68
Not classified in published results97

What Crypto Teams Should Check

Optimizely's customer actions and Sri Lanka CERT's November 18 advisory give a workable order.[1, 3]

  • Confirm with your Optimizely Customer Success Manager whether your projects were affected, and your exact exposure window.
  • List pages the snippet ran on, transfer pages first. Until confirmed, cover Report URI's observed span: 04:21 to 23:11 on November 16.[4]
  • Search web, CDN, CSP and proxy logs for 1688360[.]cc, pay-cloud[.]online and pay-relay.wordpressadmin001.workers[.]dev.[6]
  • Review crypto transactions made through your site that day, matching destinations against your own address records.
  • Retain web server, CDN, WAF, CSP, payment and fraud logs covering November 16.
  • Remove the snippet from payment and transfer pages that run no experiments.
  • Set restrictive script-src, connect-src and frame-src policies on pages that move funds.
  • Inventory third-party JavaScript and alert on unexpected changes.
  • Ask legal counsel whether you owe notifications to customers or regulators.
  • Update staff iPhones and iPads to the latest iOS and iPadOS versions.

Guardian Analysis: Bind the Destination

This section is Guardian analysis. It is not a finding about Optimizely or any affected site.

The closest mechanism is L-06, a Low-severity finding in Guardian's public Paxos Labs Nucleus Boring Vault report, dated July 2, 2026.[12]

A backend-signed quote carried the payout receiver, and the contract only checked that it was nonzero.

A compromised quote signer could redirect the full payout unless the frontend checked the receiver against the user's intended recipient. The finding was acknowledged.

Different layer, same rule. A destination that mutable offchain code can rewrite must be checked against something that code cannot touch.

On a deposit or withdrawal page, that means a server-side address record and confirmation on the signing device, not the rendered page alone.

Frequently Asked Questions

Do Optimizely customers need to reset passwords or API tokens?

No password or API token reset is required, Optimizely says. It recommends reviewing user permissions, enabling MFA and connecting logins to a corporate identity provider.[1]

How did the attacker pick which customers to target?

Optimizely says account and project IDs are visible in the public snippet. The attacker then guessed employee email variations, up to thousands of times per customer. Access to one customer account gave no access to another.[1]

Should we block Optimizely's CDN?

Sri Lanka CERT advises against broad blocking, since the CDN's presence alone does not indicate compromise. Optimizely has withdrawn its early November 16 advice to switch Web Experimentation off.[1, 3]

Can Project JavaScript edits require approval?

Not yet. Optimizely lists approval before publishing, or limiting who can edit Project JavaScript, as a pending feature request. Its restoration of injected projects appears in project history as an "Optimizely Support" change.[1]

Sources

  1. Optimizely: Security Incident Initial Report for Customers – Optimizely Web Experimentation
  2. Optimizely Service Status: Web Experimentation Security Incident
  3. Sri Lanka CERT: Optimizely Web Experimentation Supply Chain Attack Affecting 178 Organizations Worldwide
  4. Report URI: World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely
  5. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42: Borrowed Code, Real Consequences: What OPTIMJACK Teaches Us
  6. BleepingComputer: Optimizely hack infected CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce sites with malware
  7. Ledger Donjon: Ledger Donjon statement on Optimizely
  8. U.Today: Crypto Wallet Ledger Confirms Security Incident Involving Third-Party Service
  9. Optimizely: Optimizely Service Status
  10. Bitquery Research: Optimizely Hack: 19 Payments, $2,260 in Crypto Lost
  11. Safeguard: Optimizely Web Compromise: What Happened and How to Defend
  12. Guardian Resource Hub: Quote signer can redirect receiver
  13. Ledger Donjon: Ledger Donjon public X statement, mirrored
  14. X Developer Platform: X IDs
  15. Twitter: Snowflake IdWorker.scala
  16. Guardian: Blockchain Penetration Testing Services
  17. Report URI: DeadTag: How Forgotten Website Tags Became a Delivery Network for iPhone Spyware
  18. Report URI: Abandoned Analytics Domain Funnels Store Visitors to DarkSword iPhone Exploits

Test the pages that move funds

Guardian's pentests cover third-party scripts, what the frontend trusts from the API, and the CDN and DNS accounts behind it. The WebApp Pentest tests transfer flows and client-side attacks. Ask us about your deposit and withdrawal pages.