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LUKSO Recovery Compromise: About 300 Profiles Hit

By Daniel GelfandPublished 4 min read

Part of our guide to smart contract vulnerabilities

LUKSO Recovery Compromise: About 300 Profiles Hit

Quick answer. Overnight on November 17 to 18, an attacker used LUKSO's email recovery backend to add controllers to about 300 Universal Profiles and took about 1.4 million LYX. The service is disabled, but installed controllers must still be removed onchain.

Watch: LUKSO Recovery Compromise: About 300 Profiles Hit 1:35
Video transcript

An attacker used LUKSO's email recovery backend to add controllers to about 300 Universal Profiles. The service is disabled, but installed controllers must still be removed onchain.

LUKSO estimates about 1.4 million LYX was taken overnight on November 17 to 18. These are rounded figures that Guardian has not independently reconciled.

LUKSO says a backend vulnerability gave the attacker control of the service's recovery profiles. With them, it installed an unauthorized controller on user accounts, and assets were transferred out.

LUKSO says the blockchain and account contracts were not compromised, and no private keys leaked. Profiles that never used email recovery were outside the exposure.

Shutting the backend down does not remove controllers it already installed. LUKSO warns that an attacker controller left on a profile can still transfer remaining tokens and collectibles. So check each profile's controllers onchain.

If a profile used email recovery, run LUKSO's read-only incident checker. Remove both malicious controllers, confirm no super permissions remain, look beyond the interface list, and recheck after adding a device.

Reimbursement is still being developed, and removing controllers does not return stolen funds. Use only LUKSO's official channels.

Read the full article, or talk to Guardian about pentesting the authentication, APIs and cloud behind any backend that can change onchain permissions.

What Happened

Overnight on November 17 to 18, 2026, an attacker took control of about 300 LUKSO Universal Profiles through the network's email-based recovery service.[1, 2]

LUKSO's postmortem estimates that approximately 1.4 million LYX was taken from those profiles.

LUKSO says a vulnerability in the service's backend gave the attacker control of the recovery profiles the service runs.

With that control, the attacker installed an unauthorized controller on users' accounts. Assets were then transferred out.

LUKSO linked its full postmortem from X on November 18 at 12:29 UTC, according to a reproduction of the post.[3]

How Recovery Became Control

Universal Profiles are account contracts. Under LUKSO's LSP6 Key Manager standard, controllers act on them, and a controller can be an ordinary key or a contract.[1, 4]

Each controller's permissions are stored in the controlled account itself, not in any offchain service.

The ADDCONTROLLER permission lets its holder grant authority to new controllers. EDITPERMISSIONS changes existing permissions, including the holder's own.

A recovery profile allowed to add controllers can add the wrong one. LUKSO says that is what happened, using recovery authority rather than any user's key.

What LUKSO Says Was Not Affected

LUKSO says the LUKSO blockchain and the Universal Profile contracts were not compromised.[1, 5]

It says no private keys or recovery phrases leaked. File-based and device-keychain backups stayed secure.

Profiles that never used email recovery were outside this incident's exposure, according to LUKSO.

Where the Funds Went

LUKSO reports that the stolen LYX was bridged to Ethereum and swapped on decentralized exchanges, including Uniswap.[5]

The swaps produced about 50 ETH, then estimated at $95,000.

That figure describes the attacker's reported proceeds. It is not a dollar valuation of what victims lost.

What Has Changed Since

By the time of its postmortem, LUKSO had disabled email recovery. It is decommissioning the service while it investigates.[1]

Shutting the backend down does not remove controllers it already installed. LUKSO warns that an attacker controller left on a profile can still transfer remaining tokens and collectibles.

LUKSO's remediation advice has also changed. Its earlier alert said both the attacker controller and the recovery controller had to be removed completely.[5]

The postmortem says to remove the attacker controller first. Users can then remove the recovery controller, or revoke only its Add Permission permission.

On November 19 at 12:40 UTC, LUKSO said the attack was contained but some profiles still required action, a reproduction of its X post shows.[6]

That follow-up urged complete removal of both malicious controllers and verification through the incident checker. It gave no count.

Earlier that day, JordyDutch, a LUKSO Foundation team member, said in a post LUKSO reposted that 150 profiles had not removed the malicious controllers or disabled all permissions.[7, 8, 9, 10]

That post gave no address list, block number or counting method, so the 150 figure is unverified.

Reimbursement is still being developed, with details expected in the coming weeks.

No payment date, settlement asset, reimbursement formula or completed repayment has been announced.

What Is Still Unknown

LUKSO has not disclosed the precise backend defect, how the attacker first got in, or when exposure began.[1]

The exact shutdown time and the attacker's identity are also undisclosed.

The 300 profiles and 1.4 million LYX are LUKSO's rounded estimates. Guardian has not independently reconciled the affected accounts or the fund flows.

The reviewed disclosures give no recovered-funds total, and report no law-enforcement action or regulatory measure.[5]

What Affected Users Should Check

If a profile ever used email recovery, treat it as exposed until its controllers have been checked onchain.

LUKSO's postmortem links an incident checker. It reads eleven known incident addresses at one block: the attacker key and ten recovery profiles.[1, 2]

The checker is read-only and needs no wallet connection or signature.

It covers only that address set and is not a general safety certification. Removing controllers also does not return stolen funds.

Where the checker and LUKSO's instructions differ, the checker itself defers to LUKSO's official channels.

For victims, our wallet-drained checklist covers recording transaction hashes and reporting the theft.

  • Run the incident checker on every profile that used email recovery.
  • Remove both the attacker controller and the recovery controller completely, as LUKSO's November 19 reminder urges.[6]
  • Confirm the old controller holds no permissions at all, super permissions included.
  • Do not rely on the interface list: a controller can be missing from it and still hold authority.
  • Recheck after importing the profile or adding a device, which can register recovery authority again.
  • Review other accounts the affected profile controls, since they may also be exposed.
  • Ignore unsolicited recovery or reimbursement offers; use only LUKSO's official channels.

Guardian Analysis

Guardian analysis: recovery authority is privileged access, as much as a signing key.

The Keplr social-login incident earlier this month turned on exposed keys; this one turns on authority recorded on each account.

What Recovery Teams Should Test

Guardian analysis: a review of a smart account system should include the recovery backend, not only the account contracts. The backend is what can grant control.

Guardian's pentests cover authentication, authorization, APIs, cloud infrastructure and automated signing, the surfaces such a service runs on.[11]

For a recovery service, that means how a request is authenticated, which identity signs the onchain grant, and what one stolen credential unlocks.

Our wallet pentesting guide covers backend authentication, recovery and key-reconstruction paths in more detail.

None of this describes LUKSO's systems beyond its public statements, or claims that testing would have prevented this incident.

Test the systems that can grant account control

Guardian's pentests cover the authentication, APIs and cloud behind any backend that can change onchain permissions.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why is unticking permissions in an interface not enough?

The checker says unticking can leave the stored value at 0x1500, three super permissions that can still move LYX and tokens. It recommends the remove-controller function, disabling every permission including the super ones, or setting the value to empty (0x).[2]

What should I do before removing the recovery controller?

The checker warns that removing a recovery controller disables LUKSO's 2FA recovery for that profile. It advises having another backup first, for example the private key of your extension controller.[2]

Sources

  1. LUKSO: Post Mortem: Security incident in the email-based recovery system
  2. UP Incident Check: UP Incident Check
  3. teapawt, reproducing LUKSO on X: LUKSO links its full postmortem
  4. LUKSO: LSP6 - Key Manager
  5. CoinMarketCap: LUKSO Says Recovery System Exploit Hit 300 Profiles, Took 1.4M LYX
  6. teapawt, reproducing LUKSO on X: LUKSO reminds affected users that some profiles still require action
  7. teapawt, reproducing JordyDutch on X: JordyDutch says 150 profiles have not taken controller-security measures
  8. teapawt: LUKSO timeline showing its repost of JordyDutch's controller-removal reminder
  9. LUKSO: Foundation | LUKSO
  10. LUKSO on Medium: About LUKSO
  11. Guardian: Blockchain Penetration Testing Services
  12. KuCoin: KuCoin Has Temporarily Closed the Deposit Service of LUKSO (LYX)
  13. Sigmatic B.V.: SIGMATIC B.V. | Software for your business