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Fluidkey Incident: Logged Session Tokens Cost $1.6M

By Daniel GelfandPublished 5 min read

Part of our guide to smart contract vulnerabilities

Fluidkey Incident: Logged Session Tokens Cost $1.6M

Quick answer. On November 19, 2026, attackers took about $1.6 million from 52 Fluidkey accounts. Fluidkey says they read session tokens from an unpatched SigNoz logging server, then queued transfers that users' apps signed. Service returned November 20. No recovery or reimbursement has been announced.

Watch: Fluidkey Incident: Logged Session Tokens Cost $1.6M 1:44
Video transcript

Fluidkey says spending keys never left users' devices. Attackers read session tokens from its logs instead. That was enough to queue transfers that users' apps later signed.

On November 19, about 1.6 million dollars was taken from 52 Fluidkey accounts across six networks, the company says.

Fluidkey says attackers hit its unpatched SigNoz logging server and read session tokens. Those let them queue transfers and raise two-factor limits. When users unlocked their apps, the apps signed.

SigNoz disclosed both flaws in September: missing authentication and a SQL injection. Fluidkey's version was affected when its first reported probes came, about seven weeks later.

Guardian analysis: a log holding session tokens is a credential store. A device-held key does not prove intent, so backend approval needs its own check.

Fluidkey says personal data on 70 accounts and viewing keys for 54 accounts were exposed. About 887 ETH went into a mixer, and no recovery has been announced.

Fluidkey says it ended every session and patched SigNoz. Transfers now need the user's key, and two-factor changes are verified on the server. None is independently audited.

Wallet teams should search logs for tokens, redact secrets before ingestion, keep query endpoints private, and set patch deadlines.

Read the full article for the timeline and open questions. Guardian's blockchain pentests cover transfer authorization, signing flows, server-side two-factor checks and secrets handling.

What Happened

On November 19, 2026, between 17:28 and 18:05 UTC, about $1.6 million was taken from 52 Fluidkey accounts, the company says.[1]

Fluidkey is a Switzerland-based, self-custodial financial app that uses stealth addresses for payment privacy.[2]

Losses spanned six networks: Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Polygon, Optimism and Arbitrum.

Fluidkey blames two vulnerabilities in its self-hosted SigNoz v0.121.1 installation, an observability tool that stored its logs. It says probes began November 5 and failed, and the attacker read logs from November 12 to 19.

Fluidkey released its postmortem on Sunday, November 22, AltcoinReporter reports. It adds the account counts, the named dependency and the fixes; no new attack is reported.[3]

Time (UTC)Event
Nov 19, 17:28First unauthorized transfer
Nov 19, 17:43First user report reaches support
Nov 19, 17:46Support escalates to engineering
Nov 19, 17:54Unauthorized transfers confirmed; shutdown starts
Nov 19, 18:05Transaction processing fully offline
Nov 19, 18:12Emergency ticket opened with SEAL 911
Nov 20, 15:27Service restored with v1.79.22

How Logged Tokens Moved Funds

The logs held user session tokens. Fluidkey says those tokens let the attacker create and approve transfer requests, and raise two-factor limits.[1]

The final step needed the user. When users unlocked their apps after payment notifications, the apps signed the transfers the attacker had prepared.

Fluidkey says spending keys never left users' devices.

Guardian analysis: a device-held key does not prove intent. Backend approval and device signing are separate trust boundaries, and each needs its own check.

The same lesson appears in the Crypto.com 2FA bypass: a second factor protects only the requests where the server checks it.

The Two SigNoz Flaws

SigNoz published both advisories in September. Fluidkey names them as the flaws exploited.[1, 4, 5]

The first, CVE-2026-92729, left trace-funnel analytics endpoints without authentication or authorization checks.

The second, CVE-2026-93292, is a ClickHouse SQL injection in the same endpoints. What it reaches depends on database permissions.

Version v0.142.0 fixed the injection only partially. The complete fix shipped in v0.142.1.

Fluidkey's v0.121.1 sat inside both affected ranges. The first probes it reports came about seven weeks after the second advisory.

Its SigNoz query interface was reachable from the public internet until the fix, Fluidkey's disclosure indicates. It does not say when that exposure began.

AdvisoryFlawCVSSAffectedFixed in
GHSA-v549-7j2x-qjm5 (Sep 14)Missing authentication and authorization8.2 Highv0.88.0 to v0.141.0v0.141.1
GHSA-w5pf-xwjh-vr5v (Sep 17)ClickHouse SQL injection7.6 Highv0.88.0 to v0.142.0v0.142.1

What Else Was Exposed

The logs also held personal data on 70 accounts, Fluidkey says: 38 email addresses, 37 names, 24 postal addresses, 17 IBANs, four birth dates and two phone numbers.[1]

Viewing keys for 54 newly registered accounts were exposed too. They reveal addresses, balances and transaction history, but cannot move funds.

Fluidkey has not said how these groups overlap with the 52 accounts that lost funds. The three counts should not be added together.

Fluidkey says affected users were contacted. Its data-protection notifications were still in progress.

Tracing and Reporting

About 887 ETH went into a mixing service on November 19, Fluidkey says.[1, 3]

After SEAL 911's emergency help, Fluidkey engaged zeroShadow to keep tracing the funds.

It reported the incident to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center and to Switzerland's National Cyber Security Centre. Further criminal complaints were planned, not yet filed.

No recovery amount or reimbursement plan had been announced by November 22. Tracing funds is not the same as recovering them.

Bitquery's independent onchain estimate, reported by CryptoSlate, put at least $1.58 million into incident-linked wallets between 17:28 and 18:04 UTC.[6]

Its wider scan also sorted about $349,000 sent to established wallets and $65,000 in unclassified payouts. Those are not extra confirmed losses, nor Fluidkey's final accounting.

What Fluidkey Changed

Fluidkey says it made these changes before restoring service. The wider review of its services and third-party tools continues.[1]

  • Ended every existing session.
  • Patched SigNoz and rotated credentials.
  • Removed public access to the log query interface.[3]
  • Stopped logging session tokens and other sensitive data.
  • Transfer requests now need authorization from the user's key, not a session token alone.
  • Two-factor limit changes are now verified on the server.

What Is Still Unknown

Fluidkey's account of cause, exposure and fixes has not been independently audited. Onchain data supports the scale and timing, not how the backend authorized transfers.[1, 6]

  • How many session tokens were exposed, and how long logs were kept.
  • Why the SigNoz server stayed on v0.121.1, and which version it runs now.
  • How the two SigNoz flaws were combined to reach the logs.
  • Who the attacker is, and whether any authority has opened an investigation.

Guardian Analysis: Logs Are Credentials

A log that holds session tokens is a credential store. Here, reading it was enough to queue transfers.

So observability is security infrastructure, and it needs a named security owner.

Our secrets management guide covers scoping, rotating and auditing credentials so one leak reaches less.

Incident runbooks should track theft, personal data and viewing-key exposure as separate workstreams. Restoring service closes none of the notification or recovery work.

Checks for Wallet and Payments Teams

These checks apply to any app where a backend prepares transactions that a device later signs. Our crypto wallet pentest guide covers the wider surface.

  • Search logs, traces and error reports for session tokens, API keys, viewing keys and personal data.
  • Redact secrets before they reach the logging pipeline, not after.
  • Keep observability dashboards and query endpoints off the public internet.
  • Inventory self-hosted tools and set a patch deadline for High advisories.
  • Require the user's key, not a session alone, to authorize transfers.
  • Verify limit and two-factor changes on the server, with a fresh second factor.
  • Show the full transfer on the device before it signs, especially after a notification.
  • Bind sessions to devices, keep them short, and rehearse revoking them all at once.

Test what a stolen session can approve

Guardian's blockchain pentests cover transfer authorization, signing flows, server-side 2FA, API permissions and how infrastructure handles secrets such as session tokens.

Frequently Asked Questions

What should teams running SigNoz do now?

Upgrade to v0.142.1 or later. Until then, SigNoz advises blocking the trace-funnel analytics endpoints at the reverse proxy or ingress. It also advises restricting the ClickHouse user to minimum privileges and disabling the url, file, remote and s3 table functions.[4, 5]

What can an attacker reach through these SigNoz flaws?

Without credentials, an attacker can read service topology, trace identifiers and error activity. Through the injection, an authenticated user can read trace, log and metrics data, enumerate tables and possibly read local files or trigger server-side requests, SigNoz says.[4, 5]

Sources

  1. Fluidkey: Security incident of 19 November 2026
  2. Fluidkey: Fluidkey
  3. AltcoinReporter: Fluidkey Says About $1.6 Million Was Taken From 52 Accounts via SigNoz Flaws
  4. SigNoz: Missing authentication on trace-funnel analytics endpoints
  5. SigNoz: Authenticated ClickHouse SQL injection in trace-funnel analytics endpoints
  6. CryptoSlate: Fluidkey’s $1.6 million hack exposes a security risk even when private keys never leave users’ devices
  7. Guardian: Blockchain penetration testing services
  8. Guardian: What Is Offchain Security? The Attack Surface Audits Miss
  9. Guardian: Third-Party Risk Management for Crypto: A Bank Playbook