Chainflip Vault Theft: BTC and ETH Taken, Bounty Offered
Part of our guide to Web3 penetration testing

Quick answer. On November 21, 2026, an attacker took 122.86 BTC, 520.22 ETH and about $4 million in stablecoins from Chainflip vaults, Chainflip Labs says. The Ethereum drain carried a valid signature, Bitquery found. A 10% bounty runs to November 23; no return is confirmed.
Video transcript
Chainflip Labs says an attacker took bitcoin, ether and stablecoins from its vaults on November 21. A ten percent bounty is open, but no return is confirmed.
Chainflip lists 122.86 bitcoin, about 520 ether and roughly four million dollars in USDC and USDT. Token counts are firmer than dollar totals.
Chainflip documents a one hundred of one hundred fifty threshold scheme for vault keys. Yet Bitquery found the Ethereum drain carried a valid signature from that shared key.
The anomaly was the nonce. Of 299,677 vault signatures since 2023, only this one broke the sequence. Bitquery says chain data cannot show whether a key leaked or a check failed.
The vault was drained in one transaction. The stablecoins were swapped for ether on Uniswap, and 2,909 ether reached Tornado Cash within minutes. Validators moved to a new key 1 hour 42 minutes later.
Chainflip says it identified how the key was exposed, prevented repeats, and reported the theft to law enforcement. No independent postmortem is public.
Guardian analysis: two control layers mean two restart gates. Show the exposure is closed, hold a witnessed key ceremony, confirm every chain accepts only the new key, and get the signing path independently reviewed.
Read the full article, or talk to Guardian. Our blockchain pentesting covers signers, threshold signing, and the cloud and automation that can reach a vault.
What Happened
On November 21, 2026, an attacker took assets from Chainflip vaults on Bitcoin and Ethereum, Chainflip Labs says.[1]
Its statement lists 122.86137042 BTC, 520.2243399 ETH, 3,249,631.41 USDC and 758,141.33 USDT.
Early reports covered only the Ethereum Vault, put at about $4.86 million. The Bitcoin loss, confirmed later, more than doubled that figure.[2, 3, 4]
CryptoWatchDesk put the combined loss near $12 million. Dollar totals move with prices, so the token quantities are the firmer record.
Chainflip's first public disclosure came on X at 09:14 UTC. It announced full Safe Mode, with deposits, withdrawals, swaps and quoting disabled, but confirmed no cause or loss.[5]
Its later statement says services are temporarily unavailable.
CryptoWatchDesk advises against sending funds to a Chainflip deposit address, or through a wallet swap routed via Chainflip. Wait until Chainflip's official X account says otherwise.
Timeline
Times are UTC on November 21 unless shown. Each row names the source that reported it.
| Time | Event | Reported by |
|---|---|---|
| Nov 11 | Attacker funded through Tornado Cash | Chainflip |
| Nov 20 | Validator account registered | Chainflip |
| 07:01 | 122.86 BTC arrives at one Bitcoin address | CryptoWatchDesk |
| 07:10:59 | Ethereum Vault emptied of ETH, USDC and USDT | Bitquery |
| By about 07:19 | 2,909 ETH enters Tornado Cash in 38 deposits | Bitquery |
| 08:53 | Validators switch to a new key | Bitquery |
| 09:14 | First disclosure on X: full Safe Mode, cause unconfirmed | AltcoinReporter |
| 19:22 | X post offers the BTC holder a 90% return deal | PandaSecurity |
| 20:12 | Return offer confirmed onchain in Bitcoin block 976,943 | Bitcoin Remembers |
| 20:50 | Stolen BTC still unmoved | CryptoWatchDesk |
| Nov 23, 18:38 | Bounty deadline | Chainflip |
How the Ethereum Drain Worked
No single party holds a Chainflip vault key. Its documentation describes a 100-of-150 threshold signature scheme across the validator set.[6]
Bitquery says the drain request carried a valid signature from that shared validator key. 0xCERT describes it as one validly signed transferBatch call.[2, 3]
The anomaly was the nonce. Of 299,677 Ethereum Vault signatures since 2023, Bitquery found only this one outside the running sequence.
That points to a signature made outside the normal validator process.
Within minutes, the USDC and USDT were swapped for ETH on Uniswap. By about 07:19 UTC, 2,909 ETH had entered Tornado Cash in 38 deposits.
That traces funds, not a person. Bitquery's trail ends at Tornado Cash.
Validators moved to a new key at 08:53 UTC, 1 hour 42 minutes after the drain. Bitquery saw no further Ethereum Vault signatures at its check.
What Chainflip Says
Chainflip says it traced the preparation: Tornado Cash funding on November 11, a FLIP purchase, a validator account registered on November 20 and the server behind it.[1]
It calls this the offending validator and says it holds identifying information on it and its use of web services.
In the THORChain signing exploit in May, a newly joined validator rebuilt a vault key.
Chainflip says it has identified how the key was exposed and has prevented future attacks of that kind.
It says the attacker's addresses are flagged with major blockchain analytics firms, that every withdrawal from the Tornado Cash pools used is being watched, and that it has reported the theft to law enforcement.
These are Chainflip's claims. No independent postmortem is public.
The Recovery Offer
Chainflip asks for 110.57523337 BTC and 2,618.1 ETH at its published return addresses by 18:38 UTC on November 23, 2026.[1]
Both are 90% figures. The BTC is 90% of the BTC Chainflip lists as taken; the ETH is 90% of the 2,909 ETH Bitquery saw enter Tornado Cash.[2]
If both arrive, Chainflip says it will treat the event as a white-hat recovery and withdraw its law-enforcement reports.
Chainflip first made the offer on X at 19:22 UTC on November 21, saying it had messaged the address holding the stolen BTC.[7]
A Bitcoin OP_RETURN message pointing to the terms was confirmed in block 976,943 at 20:12 UTC.[8]
The stolen BTC had not moved at CryptoWatchDesk's 20:50 UTC check.[4]
As of November 22, no reviewed public source confirms a return. The ETH side is harder to recover, because it has already passed through Tornado Cash.[9]
Two Layers of Emergency Control
Chainflip's documentation says full Red Safe Mode stops egress transactions, automatic vault rotations and supply-sync transactions until governance exits the mode.[6]
Separately, the Governance Council can freeze smart-contract vaults. An extreme recovery withdrawal after a freeze needs Community Council approval.
That is documented design. Public sources do not show which of these steps Chainflip used here, beyond the full Safe Mode it announced.[5]
Guardian analysis: two layers mean two restart gates. State Chain egress and each contract vault need their own evidence before they reopen.
Signer independence decides what 100-of-150 really means. If many validators share hosting, software or operators, the effective threshold is lower.
A monitor on the vault's signature nonce could flag a drain like this, but not stop one that lands in a single transaction.
Our private key compromise runbook sets out containment, rotation, root-cause work and notification in order.
What Is Still Unknown
Bitquery saw no spending from Chainflip's Bitcoin vault address since November 20.[2]
Chain data shows the 122.86 BTC was first consolidated from two outputs at a taproot address into a new address, in a block timestamped 06:41 UTC. It was then sent on at 07:01 UTC.[4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
Chainflip has not said whether either address was its own. Its docs describe deposit and vault-swap addresses separate from the main vault.[16, 17]
- The key-exposure mechanism, which Chainflip has not described. Bitquery says chain data cannot show whether a key leaked or a check failed.[1]
- Full cross-chain scope. Bitquery did not check Solana, and Chainflip's early posts gave no status for other vaults.[5, 7]
- Any public confirmation from an authority of the law-enforcement reports Chainflip describes.
- When Chainflip leaves Safe Mode. Its displayed X posts give no exit or restart date.[9]
Restart Checklist for Vault Operators
These checks apply to any protocol whose vaults answer to a validator or threshold key. Our cross-chain bridge security guide covers the wider failure patterns.
- Name the exposure mechanism and show it is closed, not only that the key rotated.
- Run a witnessed key ceremony on hosts rebuilt from known-good images.
- Review validator set changes made shortly before the incident, including new registrations.
- Confirm that every vault on every supported chain accepts only the new key.
- Reconcile each vault's balance against protocol accounting before egress reopens.
- Have the signing path reviewed independently before lifting Safe Mode or any vault freeze.
- Publish who approved each step of the restart, and when.
Test the signing path before value moves again
Guardian's blockchain penetration testing covers key management and signers, including threshold signing, plus the cloud and automation that can reach a vault.
Frequently Asked Questions
Was Chainflip's Arbitrum vault drained too?
Not on the evidence so far. Bitquery's morning check found ordinary Arbitrum payouts, the largest about $50,000 in USDC. PandaSecurity notes that a snapshot is not proof every other vault was untouched.[2, 7]
How did the attacker pay for the Ethereum drain?
Bitquery says the attacker wallet received 0.99 ETH from Tornado Cash at 07:09:59 UTC for gas, one minute before the drain transaction.[2]
How was the ETH split in Tornado Cash?
Bitquery counts 29 deposits of 100 ETH and nine of 1 ETH, in three batches within 48 seconds. Our guide on whether stolen crypto can be traced explains why mixers break the trail.[2]
Related reading
- thorchain tss exploit explained
- cross chain bridge security
- private key compromised runbook
- offchain automation pentest
Sources
- Chainflip Labs: Message from Chainflip Labs
- Bitquery: Chainflip Hack: One Rogue Signature Drained $4.86M
- 0xCERT: Chainflip Ethereum vault drained of about $4.86M via validly signed transferBatch
- CryptoWatchDesk: Chainflip says attacker took 122.86 BTC, offers 10% bounty
- AltcoinReporter: Chainflip Enters Safe Mode Over Potential Exploit as About $4.86M Leaves Its Ethereum Vault
- Chainflip: Governance & Security
- PandaSecurity: Chainflip Vault Drain: Valid Aggregate Key Signature
- Bitcoin Remembers: Chainflip: return 90%, keep 10%. Addresses and terms
- teapawt X mirror: CHAINFLIP (@Chainflip)
- Ordinals: Transaction 20262de39ec3331d78be2b87f18c90cb2ee30363311dd43def14c3aecf155b7a
- Ordinals: Output 15f45aeefb34b5c7d6747615c7cb467b45891f50a175ca4af4631508e8483936:1
- Ordinals: Output bb807d0423ec659a0a269c945fc0414330bf44e228a467f954025cdc7816fb09:1
- MyBitcoinExplorer: Bitcoin Block 976,863 — Transactions & Details
- Mempool: Bitcoin Block 976863
- Ordinals: Transaction ac38a5aea1ed81b84307a3709f502abd4c4d3af5502493f883c6d19624fd2cb4
- Chainflip: Bitcoin Vault Design
- Chainflip: Protocol Node RPC Requests
- Guardian Security: Blockchain Penetration Testing Services
- Ordinals: Previous output 20262de39ec3331d78be2b87f18c90cb2ee30363311dd43def14c3aecf155b7a:0
- Chainflip: Chainflip Knowledge Hub
- BTCIntel: Bitcoin transaction e1e544…0a6a · 142.92 BTC · block 976,503